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The paper uses a structured database of national planning that ESCWA is compiling to identify the 
well-known and lesser-known features of development planning in the Arab region. The paper first 
explores international best practices and reflects on country-specific context to develop a typology of 
good planning criteria for the Arab region. Based on this typology, the paper offers preliminary stylized 
facts about planning and compares individual planning initiatives across the region. Above all, the 
findings indicate the region is suffering with the following difficulties: (1) a lack of structure among 
individual planning documents, (2) a weak relation to international frameworks, (3) the paucity of 
specific measurable indicators that would help to effectively monitor achievements, (4) many 
countries did not publish any planning documents targeting the long-term and medium-term 
development of their whole economy at all or (5) did not make them readily available on-line, which 
points towards insufficient transparency and impaired participation. Finally, the paper envisions a way 






Arab countries are very diverse in terms of size, geography, level of income, natural resource 
endowments, economic structure, human capital quality, social structure and institutions but all are 
facing daunting challenges. Oil-exporting countries are suffering with the volatility of oil prices, lack of 
diversification and low employment of nationals in the private sector. Oil-importing and labor 
abundant countries are experiencing high unemployment rates, especially among youth, chronic fiscal 
deficit and external imbalances. All are directly or indirectly exposed to the negative impact of long-
lasting conflicts. Although weakly integrated at the regional level through trade, Arab countries 
strongly depend from a common resource-base, providing rapid economic development for some, 
remittances and investment for others (AEIRI, 2017, Economic and social survey, 2017). None of them 
experienced a proper structural transformation despites attempts at diversification in several points 
in time. As a result, all are vulnerable to external shocks while none benefited much from previous 
globalization waves, the emergence of global value chains, or the rise of emerging economies.  
Arab countries have also in common a state-led development model which policies geared towards 
redistribution have been strongly criticized as Arab countries were falling behind, recording poor 
economic and human outcomes over the last two decades which led to the Arab upheavals (Selim and 
Zaki, 2014, Mahdavi, 2017, Kumar and Ali, 2016, Nakhle, 2017). Nevertheless, in most Arab countries, 
there is a body responsible for setting national plans which capacities to design strategies and develop 
policy options to achieve planned targets have proved ineffective (UNDP, 2016b). It is thus imperative 
to take a closer look at the reasons for the existing gaps between stated targets and their realization 
so as to revisit the planning practices with a view to increase applicability and efficiency.  
In order to get a better understanding of planning practices in the Arab region, the paper starts by 
identifying relevant criteria of good practice in development planning aligned with international best 
practices. The influence of Arab countries’ socio-political specificities on good planning criteria is 
discussed. A topology of criteria for good planning is then established that differentiates between 
operational and strategic criteria, on one hand, internal and external criteria, on the other hand. The 
evaluation of Arab countries’ performances provided in the paper focuses on the internal and 
operational good planning criteria that are core pre-requisites to planning effectiveness.  
The paper uses a structured database newly compiled by ESCWA that offers information on Arab 
countries’ planning practices. Information, from planning documents readily available on the internet, 
were gathered, classified and standardized so as to be comparable across countries. The database 
distinguishes between the different types of documents available, according to their coverage, 
content, overall architecture, and objectives-pillars-key-performance-indicators’ linkages within and 
between planning documents. The paper (1) extracts stylized facts about planning in the Arab region, 
(2) carries detailed cross-country comparisons (Egypt and Saudi Arabia), and (3) identifies patterns 
after having grouped countries based on several of their structural features. The paper brings an 
original contribution to the literature on planning practices in the Arab region which were impossible 
to investigate in the absence of comprehensive and standardized information on the issue. Policy 
recommendations for effective development practices and achievement of the 2030 agenda are 
provided. 
The first section of the paper offers a brief review of the history of economic planning since the 1950s 
and looks into its legacy before to argue in favor of a new type of planning, integrative and strategic. 
The second section presents the analytical framework and the methodology used to evaluate Arab 
countries’ performances. The section also discusses the way the specific socio-political situation in 
Arab countries affects their approach to good planning, and whether it should be reflected when 
selecting criteria of good planning. The third section provides stylized-facts on planning for the Arab 
region before elaborating on the specific cases of Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The section also studies the 




I. The importance of planning for development 
Economic planning refers to the deliberate actions by the state or the government1 with a view to 
achieving specific outcomes at some future dates. The rationale for government actions originates in 
the theories of market failure which inhibit both efficient allocation of resources and the economic 
growth process. Two main sources of market failures were originally considered: the lack of 
competition and the existence of externalities, and increasing returns to scale. Later were added 
issues pertaining to information imperfection, innovation and adoption or adaptation of technologies, 
among others (Malinvaud, 2000).  
Against this backdrop, many features of a society may influence the functions devoted to the state 
and shape planning practices and goals which may entail the place allotted to consensus building and 
information exchange within the government and with the civil society; the degree of reliance on 
governments’ regulations; the size of the private sector; the intensity of economic and technical 
education; the economy’s capacity to innovate; the society’s values; the level of development and so 
forth (Sayigh, 1978a). However, ‘few, if any, economies have succeeded without some role for 
government – and a fairly important role at that’ upon Stiglitz (1997). On the other hand, economic 
circumstances as well as the analytical framework and ideas about development planning have 
evolved over time, shaping perspectives on the best ways to strike a balance between the respective 
roles of the state, and the market and to make their interaction effective for development. 
Assessing Arab countries’ performances at planning requires first to understand the evolution of the 
analytical underpinnings of Arab state’s interventions and, thus, of the role of the state overtime and 
how it shaped planning practices. The section starts by briefly reviewing the planning approaches that 
were successively adopted by Arab countries since the end of World War II, the development models 
that supported them, the nature of the social contract and the role of the state. These evolutions were 
driven by several sets of changes at the international (economic, and technological evolution), regional 
(interdependence between Arab states through migration) and national levels (demographic 
evolution, informality, governance).  
The lessons leant from these experiences help draw the contours of a new social contract for the Arab 
region coherent with population’s needs which implies a redefinition of the role of the state. On this 
basis, the type of planning required for the region to achieve its full development potential is in turn 
investigated in detail. The section concludes that there is a need for a new approach where the state’s 
actions would aim at incentivizing the private sector, and would be informed and supported by an 
integrative form of planning.  
 
1. A brief history of development planning in the Arab region 
In the wake of the international order’s collapse and the Great Depression of the 1930s, the state was 
generally considered as the main provider of welfare. An interventionist approach of planning was 
adopted in most developed and developing countries as well. After the second World War and until 
the 1970s, the emphasis was on a structuralist development approach, along the line of the 
neoclassical paradigm upon which market failures are prevalent, especially in developing countries. 
The role of the state as a key player in the economy was, thus, further reaffirmed.  
In the Arab region, this interventionist trend was reinforced by the state-building process in which the 
newly independent Arab countries had recently embarked. The interventionist welfare state, 
sometimes militarist, was embodying the equilibrium reached among the political forces that had 
emerged and massively mobilized prior to the independence. It was also a reaction to the feeling that 
                                                     
1 ‘state’ and ‘government’ are used interchangeably in this paper. 
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newly established Arab states had to protect themselves against numerous threats, from internal 
conflicts and coups to foreign military interventions (Beblawi, 1997). At the time, states’ intervention 
in the economy was extensive, exerted through explicit planning with a view to keep a tight grip on 
the economy. Industrialization through imports substitution was the norm. The consequence was the 
development of ineffective industries, incapable to cope with international competition.  
The Arab region gave birth to a specific type of interventionist state. The Arab region is endowed with 
large oil and natural resources wealth which resulted in the formation of rentier-states whereby 
citizens accept the state’s authority in return of security, access to social services at a minimal price 
when not for free, and distribution of rent from oil income. However, in non-oil rich countries were 
established very similar social contract and authoritarian and military type of state due to the 
existence of conflicts and the perceived need by the rulers to control the masses that had brought the 
independence (Yousef, 2004, Sayigh, 1978b). In the Arab region, the state was thus responsible for 
providing to the population a wide range of public goods, from infrastructure to health and education 
services. Vast redistributive programs were carried through subsidization. The contribution of the 
private sector to economic growth and job creation was minimum. Finally, although not closely 
integrated through trade, Arab countries’ economic fate was largely intertwined as non-oil rich 
countries were benefitting from oil-exporting countries’ wealth through intra-regional flows of 
investment and remittances.    
In the 1980s, a radical shift in development thinking occurred in the aftermath of the debt and 
development crisis that were seen as the consequences of the interventionist state model’s failure. In 
the 1980s and until the 2000s, the Washington Consensus, strongly advocated by international 
organizations, influenced Arab countries’ reform efforts that were re-geared towards macroeconomic 
stability, fiscal discipline, trade and financial openness, and privatization.  Embracing the market, and 
by extension the international market was not a panacea though. Arab countries generally resisted 
the global urge to globalize as they ended up being worse off in the short-  and medium-term as past 
development policies had translated into poor competitiveness and inadequate industries incapable 
to face competition in international markets. The 1980s were also marked by declining oil prices, 
which affected directly oil-rich countries and indirectly the rest of the Arab region due to the 
interdependencies built through intense labor migration and foreign direct investment. The region 
went through a prolonged slowdown in economic growth.  
Throughout the years, the rentier-state had led to extensive clientelism and comparatively weak 
governance and, in turn, to insufficient investment, incapacity to attract foreign direct investment, 
low productivity gains and reduced capacity to adjust to economic shocks, whether internal or 
external. Hesitant and uneven ability and will to introduce the necessary reforms further undermined 
economic performances (Adams and Page, 2001, Dahi and Demir, 2008, IMF, 2015). Governance 
quality2 alone was so degraded in the MENA region that had it been raised to a level similar to Asia 
countries at the time (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand), the region would 
have recorded growth rates higher by about 1 percentage point a year, and the regions’ average 
income would have been twice what it was at the end of the 1990s (World Bank, 2003).  
In the 2000s, several studies showed that, contrary to previous findings, the state had had a crucial 
role in East Asia countries’ economic take-off. Hence, the dominant development paradigm changed 
to refocus on the old developmental state concept. Upon this line of thoughts, development is 
possible mainly through markets which does not mean that the state’s role is minimal, as advocated 
by the Washington Consensus. At the contrary, its role is key. In parallel, analytical work demonstrated 
                                                     
2 Governance is measures using 2 indexes pertaining respectively to the quality of administration in the public sector 
and of public accountability. The former captures the efficiency of the bureaucracy, the rule of law, the protection of 
property rights, the level of corruption, the quality of regulations, and the mechanisms of internal accountability. The later 
measures the openness of political institutions and participation, respect of civil liberties, transparency of government, and 
freedom of the press. The performances of Arab countries, in particular oil-rich ones, on the first index are close to those of 
countries with similar income level but a large gap shows on the second index.  
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that economic growth crucially needs sound institutions and good economic governance. As a result, 
economic development thinking and planning practices’ focus shifted towards understanding and 
harnessing the complementarities between institutions and markets, fostering institution building, 
and improving good governance and policy implementation. The government’s responsibility was not 
any-longer to get the policies right but the ‘rules of the game’, that is the institutions, right.  
Arab states, though interventionists, were reluctant to introduce governance related reforms. Arab 
countries’ performances were and still are sizably below Singapore’s on the World Bank indicators of 
governance and below Korea for the regulatory quality, voice and accountability, and rule of law 
indicators (annex 1 compare the indicators for 2000, 2010 and 2016). Arab countries are severely 
underperforming in comparison to a set of natural competitors from Asia (China, Indonesia, India, 
Korea, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey and Vietnam) and Europe (Poland) having reached 
similar levels of development and which are thus in a better position to attract foreign investment. 
Expectedly, Arab least developed countries are very low in the rankings as well as conflict affected 
countries, that is Iraq, Libya and Syria. All Arab countries are sizably below the average on the voice 
and accountability front. Among the GCCs, Saudi Arabia followed by Kuwait are underperforming, as 
well as Algeria, among the Mashrek and Maghreb countries (Annex 1). Besides, Arab countries have 
been falling behind the countries recording the highest scores on several fronts in the doing business 
ranking which tracks the sentiment of the business community towards the conduciveness of the 
business environment. No noticeable improvement was observed since 2010, or in reaction to the 
Arab upheavals of 2011, while many aspects directly depend on the state’s actions.  
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Arab countries had managed to make sizable progresses in terms of 
economic growth, lower mortality rates and longer life expectancy, higher literacy and education 
levels of the population in general, enabling them to achieve their MDGS. But down the line, changing 
demographics, the rising contribution of the private sector to national wealth production, increasingly 
educated population, and mounting informality, to name only the main factors, paved the way to a 
deep questioning of the social-contract then in force.3 Indeed, the Arab ‘youth bulge’, a phenomenon 
that relates to the fact that a large part of the population is under the age of 25 in the Arab region, 
could have brought what is called a ‘demographic dividend’, by strongly sustaining economic 
development, if engaged in productive participation while moving into the workforce. However, this 
opportunity remained largely untapped and became a destabilizing force, as in Arab countries youth 
unemployment is the highest in the work, overshooting 25 percent. Besides, growing population 
lessen the link between the rulers and the ruled. In the same time, the rentier state model had 
translated into an inefficient bloated public sector impossible to sustain over the long-run, especially 
during episodes of volatile or diminishing fiscal resources. Further, starting from the 1980s, Arab 
governments had had no other choice than to encourage the expansion of the private sector which 
two decades later was calling for a renegotiation of the social contract as its contribution to financing 
infrastructures and fueling GDP had gone increasing. Finally, due to the welfare state model and the 
need of economies to have highly skilled human capital to thrive economically after the third industrial 
revolution, Arab population had grown increasingly educated and had developed strong claims for 
quality jobs, better economic prospects and greater involvement in the policymaking process (Yousef, 
2004). In the end, the failure of the interventionist rentier state model and weak governance had 
translated into a poor contribution of the formal labor market to employment creation and mounting 
informality (figure 1). All these elements led to the Arab upheavals. 
Figure 1: Contribution of the private sector to GDP and employment 
                                                     
3 Although we acknowledge that a distinction should be made between various groupings, such a detailed analysis is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Besides such in depth analysis has been undertaken by ESCWA throughout various 
documents (ESCWA, 2015, ESCWA, 2016, ESCWA, 2017a,b and c). 
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Source: World Economic Forum (2011) Note: data from European Commission SME Performance Review; US Department 
of Statistics; OECD; UNECE; World Bank; Zawya; Booz & Company, Selected Countries data for 2008 
 
2. The need for a new type of planning: integrative planning 
Based on the above developments, numerous studies call for the establishment of the new social 
contract between the state and the society in the Arab region. The Arab region needs to revisit its 
planning approach that should be market oriented, pragmatic, flexible and inclusive. This new form of 
planning in the same time indicative and integrative is meant to direct and incentivize the private 
sector, but also the society at large, which can be achieved if the state takes into account the 
quantitative and qualitative structure of the economy, and acknowledges the crucial contribution of 
the private sector. It also requires a sophisticated type of institutions and strategic communication 
policy, capable of influencing the private sector. As planning is not any more about controlling and 
commanding but about piloting the market-based economy, the state must convince economic agents 
to take on board the set targets, which would be its main way to impact economic outcomes at the 
sector level and all the way down to the production units, so as to reach the stated objectives.  
 
i. The role of governance in achieving economic development 
Structural transformation coupled with effective allocation of resources are considered the main 
vehicle to accelerate the process of economic development. Trade and economic openness further 
fuel the process by pushing resources towards the most competitive sectors on the global level.  
In such a context, a strong relation exists between institutions quality and transaction costs where 
better institutions reduce the uncertainties and risks of investment. Governance, defined by the World 
Development Report 2017 as the process through which state and non-state actors interact to design 
and implement policies within a given set of formal and informal rules that shape and are shaped by 
power, becomes a catalyst to structural transformation and development and the mean through 
which development plans work their way through the economy.  
In the Arab region, economic governance’s weak quality negatively impacts business environment’s 
conduciveness. Regulatory opacity and ambiguity are the bedrock of unequal, discretionary and 
preferential implementation of announced policies and regulations which lead to unfairness, 
anticompetitive practices, and further political capture by agents seeking privileged access. 
Entrepreneur surveys carried in the Arab region show that corruption, informal and unfair 
competition, regulatory policy uncertainty, and tax administration have weighted on exporting-firms’ 
productivity and competitiveness (Ianchovichina, 2011, figure 2a and b and 3).  
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Figure 2a: Leading constraints to export-oriented firms in developing oil exporting countries (share 
of firms ranking a constraint as “major” or “severe”) 
 
Source: Ianchovichina, (2011). Estimates based on enterprise survey data for Algeria, Yemen and Syria. 
Note: Individual country outcomes were weighed with the relative sizes of countries’ labor forces. Results do not change 
when population numbers are used as weights instead.  
 
Figure 2b: Leading constraints to export-oriented firms in oil importing countries (share of 
firms ranking a constraint as “major” or “severe”) 
 
Source: Ianchovichina, (2011). Estimates based on enterprise survey data for Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco. 
Note: Individual country outcomes were weighed with the relative sizes of countries’ labor forces. Results do not change 
when population numbers are used as weights instead.  
 
Figure 3: Global Competitiveness Index rank of oil importers and oil exporters in the Middle East and 
North Africa, 2016–2017 edition 
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Source: Global Competitiveness Report 2016-2017 
When investigating the reasons of the differences in economic growth rates achieved by Arab 
countries and China, Thailand, Malaysia, Poland and Turkey, it appears that the private sector’ 
response to reforms has been dissatisfying and far below what was observed in the latter high-growth 
group of countries. Though few policy gaps remain, the weak response of the private sector to reforms 
in the Arab region was not due to a deficit of market-oriented measures, or to differences in reforms’ 
orientation which, on paper, look very similar, but to policy uncertainty and arbitrariness, in policies 
implementation and rules enforcement (World Bank, 2009). The situation partly explains that, in the 
MENA region, the private formal sector provides only 10 percent of total employment in the private 
sector figure 1, WEF, 2011). Weak governance muted the response of private investment to reforms 
and Arab governments’ attempts to improve economic growth through planning failed to incentivizing 




Source: World Bank, 2009 
Long-lasting distortions from weak governance to excessive business regulations hampered the 
mechanisms through which the state can enhance private sector development, leading to low 
investment rates, slow economic growth, and rising informal employment. The reason is that 
distortions prevent the expansion of the formal competitive sectors while stiffer competition from 
abroad reduces the contribution of the other sectors to economic growth and job creation, 
especially in the formal sector. Over the long run, persistent poor economic governance 
performances undermined Arab states’ credibility and further deteriorated the state’s control over 
the economy by loosening the link between reforms and economic growth, on one side, 
development, on the other.  Paradoxically, some Arab planning documents incorporate key 
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performance indicators pertaining to investment at the regional and sectoral levels, and sometimes 
foreign direct investment, which are in fact out of reach. The role of the private sector in Arab 
planning must revisited. 
 
ii. The centrality of economic agents in planning 
Although Arab states have been heavily involved in the economy even when the scope and means of 
intervention changed, most Arab countries, especially non-oil-rich countries, were, to some extent, 
market-driven economies. However, planning practices are traditionally oblivious of the role of the 
market forces and prices in the allocation of resources between competing projects. These approaches 
leave thus little room of maneuver for the private sector to help the economy find and reach the 
optimal equilibrium through their optimization behaviors. Over the long term, the lack of an open 
dialogue and debate resulted in a crisis of trust between the government and the private sector. 
Today, in the Arab region, a common belief inherited from old development approaches and the poor 
outcomes of Arab planning attempts is that the economy does not need the state to function properly 
and ensure the effective allocation of scarce resource, and that, at best, the government’s actions will 
distort the functioning of the markets. 
Adopting a market system approach, where planning builds not only on prices but also on fully 
developed markets’ signals and incentives as mechanisms for economic and social coordination is now 
necessary to improve the region’s economic prospects. Markets can provide much more quick, 
flexible, precise and non-ideological measurements and evaluations than any governmental body. In 
such a context, private sector’s reactions to the stimuli provided by the government determine the 
outcome and success of the plan. The role of the state is here to control the outcomes of the market 
by incentivizing economic agents. NGOs participation is also key to a plan’s success through the 
momentum they can bring to achieving the expected goals through rising awareness about the plan, 
foster public ownership, and creating a consensus within the society. NGOs can also offer their 
technical expertise and financial resources.  
All currently in-force plans are considering the private sector as a key driver of the economy which 
weight will be increased over time, including in the heavily state-led development of the GCC (Hvidt, 
2012). The success of these plans relies on the capacity of Arab governments to break with their 
routine planning practices to adopt an integrative approach of planning. At the core of the integrative 
planning framework lays new Keynesian models upon which an optimal equilibrium can be reached if 
the state reduces market failures, and lower uncertainties and risks attached to economic decision-
making. The state acknowledging the centrality of the private sector, which many Arab planning 
bodies do, is only a very preliminary step. A new integrative planning ideology must be developed that 
1) recognizes the importance of planning to achieve goals, 2) factors in resources scarcity, 3) builds on 
existing complementarities between the government and the private sector, 4) aims at piloting market 
forces and influencing the private sector, which is the main driving force of the structural 
transformation process, 5) and recognizes the importance of economic agents’ expectations in 
determining the outcomes, 6) understands the need to build strong, transparent, and accountable 
institutions, and 7) makes use of the most up-to-date advances in economic theory to upgrade its 
economic frame of reference. Such a move towards integrative planning necessitates to restore the 
dialogue and build a strong credibility for the state as a policymaker and a provider of information on 
economic prospects. 
 
iii. Building credibility 
Influencing and piloting the private sector and the civil society expectation is not an easy task. The 
state must be credible to be able to anchor economic agents’ expectations. Failing to anchor 
expectations will result in missing the stated goals but may increase extrinsic uncertainties and 
encourage herding behavior, namely a situation where economic agents ‘mimic each other's behavior’ 
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instead of studying market fundamentals. The consequences are typically crisis not always justified by 
economic fundamentals, and fast and global contagion. Resident and non-residents investors are 
especially prone to adopting such type of irrational behavior (Bekaert and alii, 2011). 
Arab governments are suffering with low credibility level and policy inconsistency problems 
(Commander, 2017). Indeed, Arab countries haven’t been able to reform effectively. Attempts to 
liberalize have been at best partial and mainly benefitted parties or cronies. Arab countries have 
shown a persistent weakness in developing policies for sustainable long-term development that would 
be at the same time strongly endorsed by the population. Instead, policymakers have repeatedly 
privileged the preservation of inefficient welfare policies nurturing unproductivity and rent-seeking.  
In a context of poor credibility of the state and distrust from the private sector, a development plan 
setting only broad targets is counter-productive as 1) it does not contribute to educate people on the 
impact that the plan will have on their lives, so it weakens the emergence of a sound debate, and 
undermines public ownership, 2) it further fuels the civil society and private sector’s distrust as broad 
targets are not binding enough, and does not show a good understanding of the functioning of the 
economy, nor a strong will to pilot it or an effective capacity to control it, 3) the weak involvement of 
the parliaments, the civil society and stakeholders in the planning process prevents the government 
to change its image, improve its credibility or build a national consensus, 4) it prevents precise 
monitoring and allows discretionary changes of targets and policies which further harm the state’s 
credibility, and 5) finally, it allows escaping accountability and, down the road, undermines future 
achievements. On the other side, in the current context, the relationship between the society and the 
government is so degraded that detailed and comprehensive plans could be seen with suspicion by 
the private sector that might fear a return of a dirigist-authoritative state. This belief will lead to a 
similarly poor engagement of the private sector.  
As a result, Arab governments should align their NDP with international agendas, chiefly the SDGs. 
Achieving the SDGs implies a good understanding of the trade-offs and synergies between the goals 
and targets which an integrative approach of planning will inform by helping gather stakeholders’ 
knowledge and experience. Furthermore, development planning being meant to bring changes to the 
underlying economic structures that may be costly for the population in the short- to medium-term, 
these changes must be monitored and reflected in the plan. Effective weathering of these changes 
will require flexibility in the planning process.  
The State further builds its credibility by making all planning documents and data pertaining to 
national plans and targets publicly available, closely monitoring progresses, making planning 
authorities’ assessment transparent, displaying transparent and clear information about regular 
revisions of expected accomplishments, and holding government officials accountable. In such a 
context, if the authorities release wrong or misleading information about the achievements, or the 
difficulties encountered and that are impeding the achievement of the stated goals, their credibility 
will not be permanently damaged, or planning capacities undermined over the long-run. The greater 
the socio-economic instability, the harder it will be to stop and reverse damages to the authorities’ 
credibility and restore trust between the authorities and the society.  
It is important to recognize that uncertainty can’t be totally eliminated. Strategic communication and 
good planning practices can contribute to bridge the gap between achievable results and 
stakeholders’ expectations, bringing legitimacy to the plan and the state. Another option to reconcile 
the stakeholder’s goals and expectations with those of the government is by developing a consultative 
and inclusive process involving all the stakeholders on top of being merely the recipients of economic 
information.  
The need for strategic and effective communication policy is thus all the more crucial. Restoring and 
strengthening credibility may entail 1) recognizing past failures and mistakes, 2) presenting accurate 
and timely facts and figures, 3) provide clear and strongly structured plans and milestones, 4) 
monitoring closely and being transparent about potential deviations, their origins and contingency 
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plans, 5) explaining effective deviations from expected accomplishments and adjustment in policies 
as well as expected outcomes, 6) avoiding contradiction among ruling elites, 7) and developing a 
culture of accountability. 
In a globalized world characterized by looser control on the economy and greater space for market 
economy, the capacity of Arab governments to influence economic agents’ decision making process 
is more than ever necessary. The need to convince, that is the need to establish strong credibility for 
the government, has become compelling to ensure effective achievements of the stated goals which 
in turn will contribute to strengthened credibility. Over time, Arab states might be able initiate a 
virtuous circle where stronger reputation to stick to their commitment will translate into higher 
responsiveness of the private sector and support from the population, which will facilitate reaching 
the stated goals. In turn, credibility will be reinforced. At the core of this virtuous process lays good 
planning which is the foundation of effective communication between the society and the state.  
 
II. The guidelines of “good planning”: The methodology 
This section aims to shed some light on what constitutes ‘good planning’. The existence of several 
projects led by different United Nations bodies aiming to strengthen and harmonize national 
development planning practices in Latin America (UN-ECLAC, 2016), Africa (UNESC, UNECA and AUC, 
2011), and South-East Asia (AP-DEF, 2016) suggests that there is 1) a set of common issues that 
individual developing countries need to deal with, 2) that similar planning processes can be used, and 
that 3) adopting a regional and/or a cross-regional lens will allow good practices identification and 
lessons to be learnt from each other’s experience. The section aims at uncovering the components of 
and develop the guidelines for ‘good planning’ that are relevant across Arab countries in light of the 
need to adopt a new planning approach advocated in the first section. It provides a typology of ‘good 
planning’ criteria based on which the analyses presented in the third section are carried.  
 
1. Good practices in drafting planning documents based on international standards 
According to the literature on good planning, it is first necessary to establish several guiding principles 
for the planning process to be comprehensive, implementable and accountable. Firstly, in the context 
of the development of the 2030 Agenda that implies the necessity for long-term planning, a new 
concept of planning, called ‘backcasting’, has been strongly recommended by development agencies. 
This planning approach is seen as the most suitable problem-solving framework to employ, in order 
to envision ‘how development should progress, with intermediate actions based on long-term 
quantitative targets’ (UN-SDSN, 2015). This technique departs from the traditional approach 
consisting of estimating potential outcomes using expected trends to develop a plan. Backcasting 
requires starting by developing a vision of the future of the economy, before to moving backward all 
the way down to the present to identify required actions that must be carried. The selected actions 
are in turn used to design a strategy and a plan (Vergragt and Quist, 2011, UN-SDSN, 2015, UNDP, 
2009). Upon this new stream in ‘good planning’ practice, SDGs indicators can be used for planning 
purpose, as the framework was built considering the underlying interactions between and within the 
goals. Each country is supposed to develop a good understanding of the nature and strength of these 
interactions, which can be positive, that is mutually-reinforcing and allowing for achieving several 
goals simultaneously, or negative, whereby trade-offs exist. The planning approach’s effectiveness is 
strongly contingent to the definition of clear, specific and workable key performance indicators (KPI), 
if the country does not use the SDGs indicators per se.  
Secondly, when it comes to designing national planning documents, several essential technical 
features are prescribed (UNDP, 2009, Tinbergen, 1964, Heal, 1973). To begin with, every nation should 
establish a comprehensive long-term vision that will guide the identification of the specific steps 
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necessary to its achievement. These steps can be short- and medium-term milestones, comprising 
objectives, programs and actions that must be ordered in a hierarchical way. Linkages between a 
broader goal and all the specific prerequisites necessary for its completion must be clearly and 
systematically identified. Importantly, each of these steps should be grounded in sound data and 
evidence-based analysis with measurable indicators of achievement that allow effective monitoring 
of the progress. Such a framework will ensure that, ceteris paribus, having reached all the KPIs means 
that the all the actions have been carried, the programs completed, the objectives achieved and the 
vision implemented.  
Thirdly, the sector-based approach to development has been sentenced inadequate as too narrow 
and replaced by a multi- and cross-sectoral planning line of thoughts. This ideology does not rule out 
the need for sector-, topic- or area-specific planning that address a specific difficulty or focus on 
enhancing a particular strength of a given economy. However, it advises to adopt a multidimensional 
view of development problems, that integrates the economic, social and environmental dimensions 
of development in all planning documents that should also cover the whole economy. As an example, 
the Rio+20 Outcome Document calls for an ‘holistic and integrated approaches to sustainable 
development’. The corollary implication is that the planning process and its implementation must be 
coherently organized across all institutions and sectors, so that it addresses the interconnectedness 
of individual domains, and the relevant implementing authorities have their roles, responsibilities and 
coordination mechanisms clearly set out. 
 
2. A topology of good planning criteria 
A comprehensive analysis of good planning necessitates to incorporate elements pertaining to the 
context and means of implementation of the plan, that are instrumental to effective development 
planning. A topology of criteria for good planning was derived from the history of planning in the Arab 
region and the new concept of planning that should be developed for the region provided in the first 
section, and the above selective literature review on international standards for good planning. This 
topology is meant to identify the elements of good planning. It shows that these ‘internal and 
operational’ elements are the foundations and minimum requirements for good planning on which all 
the other elements rest.  
Firstly, in order to give a typology of good planning, we group internal and external criteria for good 
planning in two categories. The internal elements are under the direct influence of planning 
authorities while the external ones track the various bargaining processes that have to be undertaken 
between the planning authorities and the stakeholders in the context of the planning exercise.  
Secondly, each of these two categories is subdivided into the operational and strategic aspects of 
planning. The operational aspects of planning simply refer to the design of planning documents, that 
is completely under the control of panning authorities. It also covers the means of an effective 
implementation of the plan.  
The strategic aspects reflect on the political economy of planning and the vested interests of individual 
institutions, groups and agents, as well as their approaches to the suggested development path (table 
1). In this sense, every plan, firstly, points out the long-term commitments of planning institutions to 
pursue sustainable and achievable paths of development; and, secondly, provides an agenda aiming 
at incentivizing economic agents and compensating the vulnerable groups. The importance of the 
latter comes from the need to modify the social contract, adopt an integrative planning approach and 
build a credibility for the state was explained in great details in the first section of the paper. The 
former captures the fact that the most severe difficulties are usually encountered while attempting to 
‘reform the reformers’ (OECD, 2010). Therefore, significant effort by the planning institution should 
be exerted in order to enhance the perception about the nature of the planning initiative by the 
implementing as well as the affected authorities. Furthermore, planning authorities can appeal to 
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international and regional organizations for effective means of evaluations and guidelines for good 
planning.  





Under the direct control 
of planning institutions 
and related to the 
design of the planning 
documents  
Operational: first phase of the planning activity pertaining to designing the 
planning documents that encompasses  
− a comprehensive long-term vision,  
− a medium-term national development plan, 
− a specific development strategy that aims for accomplishment of the 
vision over the medium-term, 
− a broad strategy, namely an explanation of the content (past, present, 
and future) of each individual plan, clearly defining its significance and 
place within the overall planning hierarchy,  
− pragmatic milestones (objectives, programs and actions) based on 
scientific research, 
− measurable key performance indicators (KPIs), 
− clear identification of the specific responsibilities for each implementing 
authority, 
− an integrated approach reflecting the variety and connectedness of 
economic sectors, 
− a clear reference to global frameworks (SDGs/MDGs). 
− etc… 
Strategic: pertaining to the strategic features of the project the Nation sets 
for itself among which  
− Perception of the binding nature of the planning documents by the 
authorities responsible for their implementation and planning 
authorities as well, 
− Will to take on board various international agendas as guides,  
− Desire to mainstream specific issues and to develop and use the 
necessary tools and trade-offs between transparency, credibility, and 






Are influenced by the 
actions of the state but 
not by the means of 
planning itself,  
and track the various 
bargaining processes 
that have to be 
undertaken between 
the state and the 
stakeholders in the 
context of the planning 
exercise 
Operational: second phase of the planning activity pertaining to its 
implementation which is contingent to the availability of various, what we 
call, ‘supporting’ elements such as 
− financing and budgeting and capacity building as means of 
implementation; 
− production of statistical information in a timely and reliable manner so 
as to improve the quality of scientific-based policy-making, 
− development of various models and tools for decision-making and 
monitoring;  
− capacity-building at all stages of the planning process for effective 
implementation of the plan or high-quality monitoring and data 
production and analyses, 
− etc… 
Strategic: elements relating to the degree of inclusiveness, institution 
building to ensure better coordination, and strategic communication with 
the public and the authorities’ ability to influence non-state actors 
through which the plan is carried among which: 
− the public’s perceived credibility of the plan, 
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− the society’s capability to process the information provided, whatever 
the source, and pertaining to the plan’s objectives, targets, means of 
implementation,  
− the perceived reliability of the released statistical information and 
monitoring process. 
− etc…,  
Source: authors’ compilation 
The selected good planning criteria are relevant for all Arab countries including the fragile and conflict-
affected ones which according to the OECD include almost half of the Arab countries: Comoros, Egypt, 
Iraq, Libya, Mauritania, The State of Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen (OECD, 2016). In 
particular, it appears that the socio-economic situation has no direct bearing on the selected set of 
internal good planning criteria on which this paper focuses (UN-ESCWA, 2016).4 However, analyses at 
the country level have to take into account the specific importance and meaning of the criteria when 
interpreting the findings (CIC, 2011).  
 
III. Data and Results 
In most Arab countries, it is possible to identify a body responsible for setting national plans, but with 
very little strategy or policy options to achieve stated targets. In order to improve the applicability of 
the concept of development planning advocated above and its chances of success in the Arab region, 
it is imperative to look closely at the planning documents’ content and their architecture along the 
lines of the internal and operational criteria developed in the methodology. This paper focuses 
intentionally on the internal operational criteria which constitute the very foundation of good 
planning. They also are low-hanging fruits in planning quality improvement as all are under the direct 
control Arab states and modifications would not imply costly, or time-consuming efforts. Evaluations 
of Arab countries’ performances on the other aspects of good planning, that is the internal strategic 
criteria and all external criteria, will be investigated in separate papers. The goal is thus to understand 
how ‘good’ and integrative planning concepts can be used effectively to achieve national objectives, 
as well as to integrate the SDGs into individual national plans.  
The section provides information about the data used and present the result pertained to good 
planning practices in Arab countries under the format of a series of stylized facts. More detailed 
information is displayed for two countries: Egypt and Saudi Arabia to provide a more concrete 
application of the methodology. The contingencies due to planning in a region crippled by conflicts 
are finally illustrated. 
 
1. Data  
This first stylized fact-finding study was carried out using the database put together by UN-ESCWA.5 
The database provides richly textured information on planning practices in the Arab region. In its 
current form, it compiles information from Arab countries planning documents currently in-use that 
were readily available online. The possibility that some documents destined to inform policymaking 
in the region might be missing is acknowledged, which is considered as an evidence of suboptimal 
communication effectiveness. Hypothesis is thus made that the collected documents are the only 
relevant ones. However, in the near future, Arab governments shall be consulted to ensure the set of 
                                                     
4 UN-ESCWA, “Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in the Arab States: 
Implementation Challenges at the National Level” (Doha: Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, December 
2016), https://www.unescwa.org/sites/www.unescwa.org/files/ministerial_sessions/docs/e_escwa_29_11_wp-1_e.pdf. 
5 The database hasn’t yet been made publicly available 
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planning document is complete and relevant. It remains that the documents, additionally to their 
informative role, have a strategic bearing as they are the ones that inform and influence economic 
agents’ decision making process, and, in turn, the planning authorities’ credibility. The database cover 
all 18 Arab countries6 although no document was available for Syria.  
In order to be able to work with the all the various documents coherently, the team within ESCWA has 
developed its own broad classification of development planning to distinguish between visions, 
national development plans (NDP), and documents with a topic-, sector-, or area-specific focus. 
According to the classification used, a vision represents a set of values, broad goals, and strategies 
that guide the direction of the long-term development of the country in the future. In this sense, a 
national development plan is a detailed periodic manual that describes the individual stages of the 
envisioned progress with specific measurable objectives for each part of the economy. By 
construction, a successful continuous achievement of these objectives should eventually lead to the 
accomplishment of the vision. Since a certain number of planning institutions decided to release a 
single leading plan that includes both vision and NDP instead of two separate ones, the database 
includes a category of ‘mixed’ documents. Finally, as its might become necessary to target some 
particular issues, the database includes ‘other’ documents categories which are released by ministries, 
or regions with a special plan. In addition, the database allows tracking linkages between individual 
planning documents. Together, national planning documents should form a clear hierarchy with the 
vision at the top as a leading document and the most recent NDP as well as other specific programs 
systematically located at the lower levels of the planning structure.  
The database collects, monitors, standardizes and classifies qualitative and quantitative information 
and provides richly structured comparable indicators that cover all internal and operational aspects 
of good planning to assess Arab countries’ performances. The database thus offers extensive 
comparable information about the content of planning documents. The information is classified using 
the architecture of documents for good planning promoted by various UN agencies. However, only 
factual and objective information about the linkages between planning documents, the availability of 
a broad strategy in visions and NDP, the internal architecture of NDPs and Visions, and the linkages 
between broad strategy-pillars-objectives-KPIs have been included. Finally, the database collected 
KPIs from Visions and NDPS. The database is a combination of string, numeric and Boolean variables 
that can eventually be combined together to construct synthetic indicators. 
 
2. Stylized facts about development planning in the Arab region 
In this section, stylized facts about planning in the Arab region are identified using the internal and 
operational criteria for ‘good planning’ presented in the section two of the paper, gathered into five 
categories tackling  
• the overall content of planning documents;  
• whether the approach is sectoral or not;  
• the challenges of setting key performance indicators; 
• the importance of clarifying the architecture of planning documents; 
• the use of international agendas as guide to stating desirable achievements; 
Avenues for improving the quality of planning and effectiveness of planning exercise are provided as 
well as insights about the possibilities to move towards a more integrative and inclusive planning 
approach.  
                                                     
6 Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, the State of Palestine, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen.  
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i. Short-sighted planning and unclear hierarchization of planning documents 
Our calculations show that 95 percent of Arab planning documents provide information on the broad 
strategy and specific objectives. Such a document might be very effective informing and helping 
coordinate planning efforts throughout the administrative apparatus, anchoring the private sector 
information, fueling the political debate and fostering the emergence of a consensus among the civil 
society (figure 5a and 5b).  
Figure 5a: Broad strategy                                                 Figure 8b: specific objectives 
 
Sources: authors’ calculations 
However, the normative and informative power of planning documents as well as their effectiveness 
as a coordination tool is undermined as our findings show that there is a great amount of visions, 
NDPs, and documents with a specific focus that are not linked in any way to the rest of the planning 
hierarchy, when such a hierarchy exists, at all (figure 6). In this case, the whole architecture of planning 
documents lacks organization and structuration which might be interpreted as a lack of vision. 
Altogether missing planning documents, whether an NDP or a Vision, and failures articulating them 
together open the door to incoherence and generally undermines the workability of the whole 
development plan. Four main types of hierarchization of planning documents among the member 
states were identified (Annex 2).  
• Firstly, some countries do not have any hierarchy at all. This might be either the case for 
countries that only possess a vision (Libya, Yemen); do not have any leading document 
(Lebanon, Morocco); or, as in the case of Mauritania, do not provide any clear linkage between 
their documents.  
• Secondly, there are three countries (Kuwait, Qatar, UAE) that have presented a long-term 
vision on the top of a clear planning hierarchy but do not currently have any NDP. In contrary 
to the previous example, this approach is farsighted and requires an extraordinary effort 
focused on developing such a medium-term plan.  
• Thirdly, there are seven countries (Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Oman, Sudan, Palestine, Saudi 
Arabia) that are characterized by a planning hierarchy that includes either both a vision and a 
clearly subordinate NDP, or a mixed document that presents both the long-term and medium-
term planning together in one place.  
• Finally, there are three countries (Algeria, Iraq, and Tunisia) that distinguish themselves by the 
lack of a vision that is instead replaced by a NDP in the position of a leading document (23 
percent of the cases). Besides, all planning documents haven’t been included in the planning 
architecture. These countries are planning too short and a lack of coherence will undermine 
the state capacity to properly accompany the structural transformation of the economy which 
is a long-term process.7  
Figure 6: Planning documents’ architecture 
                                                     









Note Dark shade: the document is a leading document, medium shade: the document is a sub-document, light shade: the 
document is a stand-alone document. In the ideal situation, the vision is the leading document, the NDP is a clearly identified 
as a sub-document that serves the implementation of the vision, and the stand-alone document identifies a specific difficulty 
that may prevent the implementation of the vision and thus should explicitly refer to the vision. 
Source: authors 
One should note that, in a context of complex political transitions and tensed socio-economic 
situations, governments may be tempted to adopt short-sighted strategy. It might be that they have 
been discouraged to undertake reforms that are not viable politically, although they bring sizable 
benefits in the long run. As an example, Arab governments have been reluctant, and many still are, to 
embark in subsidy reforms, exchange rate depreciation or progressive taxation implementation which 
would hurt large groups of people in the short run, although necessary to ensure long-term economic 
growth and fiscal balance (Boersma and Griffiths, 2016, World Bank, 2014). Governments may also be 
unwilling to announce a long-term strategy because of the difficulty and potentially high political cost 
of committing to achieve long-term goals while the future is uncertain and the present environment 
is largely unstable and unpredictable due to the ongoing conflicts and their spillover effects. This 
applies firstly to conflict-affected and fragile Arab countries which upheld some degree of planning 
and will to intervene to maintain macroeconomic stability such as Libya (Rother and alii, 2016). The 
country developed a three phases short-sighted vision which entails, the first one aiming at ending 
the conflict and unite stakeholders, the second at rebuilding the institutions and create a good 
environment for business, the third at restarting economic growth. 
Whatever the origin of deliberately short-sighted plans, a long-term strategy is recommended.8 Firstly, 
it allows for a smoother management of the economy by the state. As an example, when facing tight 
fiscal resources, including in the GCCs, a long-term strategy would permit the state to gradually reduce 
large fiscal deficits, thereby limiting depressing influence on economic-growth and employment, in 
the long-run. Secondly, some programs have long gestation and payoffs periods and therefore need 
state backing, especially in conflict-affected and fragile states. Adopting a long-term strategy is 
especially important to producing public goods, such as infrastructure or higher-quality educational 
and health systems, which requires time. Such endeavors are among the main responsibility of any 
government and is crucial to ensure equal opportunities for all, economic and human development. 
One typical example here is climate change mitigation, a problem particularly acute in Arab countries, 
which necessitates long-term commitments while negative short-term effects might not be strongly 
felt which do not encourage unwilling to pay population to commit.  Upon the Arab Sustainable 
Development Report ‘the path to sustainable development necessarily passes through integrated, 
long-term and evidence-based planning and investments that take into account the risks and 
consequences posed by the turmoil in the region’ (ESCWA, 2015).  
                                                     
8 Long-term refers to 6 years and above timespan documents in UN-ESCWA database. 










ii. Insufficient sectoral emphasis 
Economic planning should concentrate on sectors in which the country has comparative advantages 
or experiences great difficulties. In both cases, it is important to understand the specific needs of the 
sector and create an environment propitious to its growth or organize its ‘productive destruction’ and 
the reallocation of freed resources which will pull the economy forward. Throughout the 1990s and 
along the lines of the big push development ideology, a first type of sectoral approach of development 
planning in great use was proposing to concentrate the actions of the state on those specific sectors 
that can make the country ‘take-off’ (Rodan, 1943). After this approach failed to bring the expected 
outcomes, an unbalanced growth theory of development emerged upon which planning authorities 
were encouraged to adopt a multi-sectoral approach but in the context of designing its broad strategy. 
The typical final planning document would thus clearly state and address specific sectoral needs 
individually but from the perspective of the ways each of them serves the development process of the 
whole economy. A third sectoral approach doesn’t use a vertical divide of the economy but a 
horizontal one where planning authorities are mindful of the cross-sectoral leviers to structural 
transformation. These overarching needs may pertain to education, research and development, or 







Figure 7: Multi-sectoral approach  
 
Sources: authors’ calculations 
Sectoral data from the UN-ESCWA database refers to the multi-lateral theory of development 
dimension but also comprises information that can help track the use of a horizontal approach by Arab 
planning authorities. Relevant targeted sectors obviously vary from one country to the other as well 
as their number and reflect the underlying structure of the observed economy, but also the country’s 
human and financial capacities or the degree of planning sophistication. 55 percent of Arab countries’ 
planning documents adopt a multi-sectoral approach (figure 7). This is inadequate given the region’s 
economic challenges and the importance of identifying areas for harnessing cross-sectoral synergies 
and spillover effects to hasten development in a context of insufficient fiscal resources and social 
pressure. However, this underpinning to development thinking is not consensual (see Nordberg and 
Steurer, 2015 for instance). Besides, many Arab countries are moving towards creating a knowledge-





of planning, starting with education quality and availability of certain skills. For now, the database 
does not allow to differentiate precisely between the vertical and horizontal sectoral components of 
the plans. This is an avenue for further research.  
 
iii. Inadequate key performance indicators’ coverage 
As said above, Arab states lack credibility, in particular with the private sector which undermines their 
capacity to pilot the economy by anchoring expectations. The central piece to remedy this problem is 
by introducing key performance indicators (KPIs) in planning documents. This operation is less 
straightforward than it seems as it entails trade-offs. 
On one side, asymmetric information is one of the market failure the state is supposed to address to 
ensure the effective allocation of scarce available resources (Stiglitz, 2002). The state can provide 
implicitly, through setting short-, medium, and long-term policy instruments, or explicitly, by setting 
detailed targets, information that will facilitate reaching a consensus among economic agents about 
the economic prospects, thereby influencing their decision-making process and the emergence of an 
equilibrium in line with the state’s vision. As a result, it might seem that the less precise the key 
performance indicators (KPIs), the less likely the convergence of the economy towards the vision.  
On the other hand, all the elements of planning documents are based on the opinion of the experts 
who were involved in their conception. In an uncertain environment, experts’ opinion about the final 
impact, trade-offs and potential shocks may differ and may be undermined by unexpected economic 
surprises. In this case, full transparency is not the optimal communication strategy. A few imprecise 
KPIs may reflect the state’s strategy to preserve its credibility as a policymaker by not disclosing an 
information precise enough to be held accountable when uncertainty reaches a certain level (Jensen, 
2001, Weber, 2008).  
KPIs are thus central to the trade-offs states have to face as they are key components of an effective 
and strategic communication policy, on one side, and determine the degree of workability of the 
strategy, on the other. Fully identified KPIs comprise four elements: 1) specific baseline, 2) target, 3) 
year of accomplishment and responsible authority, 4) which stands for an accountable checklist of the 
plan. Only KPIs displaying all those four pieces of information allow for close monitoring the progress 
of its implementation.  
Figure 8: Fully identified specific KPIs 
 
Sources: authors’ calculations 
Only 42 percent of the KPIs included in Arab countries’ visions and NDPs are fully identified, 28 percent 
are missing one information among the four that are necessary to be fully identified. 30 percent of 
the KPIs are vague which practically implies that the policymakers would have difficulties in reaching 
them (figure 8). Several factors may explain this finding. For instance, when the total number of KPIs 
included in a document is very large, many of them might not be fully identified as more detailed plans 







additional degrees of freedom. The country’s level of development may also have an impact as it 
determines the skill level of human resources responsible for formulating the planning documents.9   
 
iv. Imprecise articulation of the goals  
Another strategic aspect of introducing key performance indicators in planning document relates to 
their linkage to objectives, or more loosely to pillars, as explained previously in the methodological 
section. Practically it means that, in the former case, if all the KPIS are met then it should be the case 
that the planned objectives have been reached and the pillars have been completed and the vision is 
implemented. In the later, achieving all the KPIs does not necessarily translate into the fulfilment of 
all the objectives and pillars, which results in a looser implementation of the vision.  
Even if the degree of identification of KPIs is debatable based on strategic reasons, the linkage of the 
KPIs to specific objectives should always be straightforward. However, direct linkages to pillars are 
considered as conflicting with good planning (Grand and alii, forthcoming). From this point of view, 
Arab countries’ performances are rather poor. 30 percent of planning documents have no KPIs. When 
KPIS have been included, 25 percent of them are inaccurately linked to broad programs, instead of to 
objectives (figure 9). Such an inadequate structuration of the planning documents’ internal content 
undermines the state’s credibility as it may be interpreted as a lack of understanding of the overall 
functioning of the economy, little confidence in its capacity to pilot the economy, or a weak 
commitment to the specified vision. Whatever the origin, an imprecise linkage of the KPIs to the goals 
undermines the potential success of Arab countries’ plans. 
Figure 9: Articulation of KPIs to other components of planning documents 
 
 
Sources: authors’ calculations 
 
v. The SDGs agenda not used as a guidance towards development 
Arab countries have committed to meet the SDGs. Doing so necessitates to incorporate the SDGs into 
their planning documents, which may further help them properly identify KPIs as mention above. The 
benefits of using SDGs as KPIs in their vision, NDP or specific plans may bring strength to Arab 
countries’ commitment by substantiating their commitment to this development framework. 
ESCWA’s database allows to track whether clear reference to MDGs (before 2015) or SDGs (post-2015) 
was made in Arab planning documents which represents the first step on the way to map the degree 
to which a development plan incorporates international frameworks of sustainable development. Our 
calculations show that the integration of such a reference in Arab countries development planning 
practices is rather weak which might explain the poor compliance with the 2030 agenda the region is 
                                                     
9 Availability of human resources have been previously classified as external supporting elements of good planning 
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currently recording. Only one third of the planning documents at hand mention the MDGs or SDGs. 
After controlling for the released date of the document, it appears that 8 documents out of 42 mention 
the MDGs while 10 documents out of 22 mention the SDGs (figure 10). This finding points towards a 
certain improvement in the mainstreaming of these agendas into national planning in the Arab region, 
provided that the trend will persist in the years to come.10 Among the many medium-term NDPs that 
will soon be replaced by their successors (a great deal of them ends in 2020), almost none mentions 
SDGs (figure 11). A closer analysis reveals that most of the documents do not mention SDGs, while 








Figure 10: Reference made to MDGs and SDGs                      Figure 11: Going global 
as development framework for the region 
  
Sources: authors’ calculations 
 
3. The specific cases of Egypt and Saudi Arabia 
Currently, the database of national planning covers in greater details planning documents in two 
countries, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, for which all objectives and KPIs were identified and listed. Both 
countries have been selected for the preliminary case study as they represent some of the best 
examples of national planning in the region. Furthermore, the planning initiatives of both countries 
aim for 2030 and are highly sophisticated, whereby they include phases with medium-term objectives, 
as well as high amount of specific KPIs.  
At first sight, the planning structure of both countries is quite sophisticated compared to the majority 
of Arab states (Annex 2). Saudi Arabia has a planning hierarchy encompassing a vision, two NDPs and 
one specific document. Similarly, Egypt has a mixed document that perfectly substitutes for a separate 
                                                     
10 So far more numerous documents were released during the MDGs era than the SDGs’. Hence only when the total 
number of documents released after the SDGs came into force at least equals the number of documents release while the 





long-term vision and medium-term NDP, as well as two additional specific documents. Closer 
examination shows that, while the Saudi NDP has its KPIs clearly linked to specific objectives in a 
hierarchical way, through the whole main Egyptian document this clear linkage is missing. Indeed, in 
the case of Egypt, the KPIs are loosely accumulated at the end of the individual chapters of the 
document and, therefore, do not provide any clear mechanism for an easy monitoring towards the 
achievement of each chapter’s objectives. On the other hand, in the case of Saudi Arabia, a second 
NDP exists that was released only one year apart from the previous one by a different planning 
institution. This document is not affiliated with the rest of the hierarchy in any way. Finally, contrary 
to Egypt, none of the Saudi documents mention MDGs or SDGs.  
Digging deeper, individual KPIs have been grouped based on their focus into categories of our own. 
The choice of these categories is quite straightforward as it is based on the main areas of potential 
intervention of the state (figure 12).11 This exercise enables a better understanding of each country’s 
priority areas, main limitations and room for potential improvement when setting KPIs.  
Figure 12: Setting priorities straight 
  
Sources: authors’ calculations 
While economic development represents the main category in both cases, Saudi Arabia has 10 more 
per cent of KPIs allocated to it than Egypt. Furthermore, while Egypt puts greater stress on education 
and training as well as knowledge, innovation, and technology, Saudi Arabia prioritizes urban 
development, infrastructure and state’s transparency and efficiency.  
Regarding the implanting authorities, the size of the implementing authorities’ in figure 13 name 
reflects the number of KPIs in its portfolio. The findings show that the responsibility for the majority 
of KPIs is significantly more decentralized in Egypt than in Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, Egypt has 
several unidentifiable authorities named ‘private sector’ or ‘civil society’ that are, according to the 
plan, directly responsible for many specific KPIs. The implementation of such is then highly 




                                                     
11 The selected categories are as follow: Economic development, Transparency and efficiency of government 
institutions, Education and training, Knowledge, innovation and scientific research, Energy, Urban development, 

























Figure 13: Responsibility and accountability 
Egypt Saudi Arabia 
Sources: authors’ calculations 
Despite both countries having a great number of full KPIs, many of them are still incomplete, as in the 
case of Saudi Arabia, or even non-existent, as in the case of Egypt. This finding is especially important 
as it highlights areas of improvement with the greatest potential impact. 
Finally, ESCWA is currently exploring options to expand the Database for National Planning to touch 
upon thematic analyses of individual KPIs at the national level among which gender, SMEs, ICT or 
green economy. For now, only information on the gender dimension has been processed. A 
preliminary examination of the gender dimension reveals that in both Egypt and Saudi Arabia only 3% 
of KPIs have a gender dimension, that is 10 out of 345 and 14 out of 493, respectively. 
 
4. The bearing of the socio-economic context on planning practices 
In order to understand the influence of the socio-economic on Arab countries’ planning approach 
practices, Arab countries have been grouped based on the ratio of their natural resource to labor 
endowment.12 The findings show that resource-rich labor-abundant countries are planning long-term 
with the average of years of their planning documents reaching 12.3 years (figure 14). They rely on 
less documents, namely 2.2 on average, against more than 4 for the other groupings. The documents 
provide less detailed guidance with only 0.5 documents on average providing quantitative targets. 
This group comprises Yemen, Sudan, Algeria, Iraq, Libya and Syria most of which are conflict affected 
which may explain their relative reluctance to strongly commit over the long run.  
With a planning timespan of 7.6 years on average, an average of 4.1 planning documents, 2.3 of them 
providing quantitative targets on average, resource-poor labor-abundant countries planning practice 
is rather short-sighted and dynamic. This planning behavior may reflect the need for flexibility in 
planning as these economies, whose main source of economic growth is their labor-force, have to 
swiftly adjust to changes in the global and regional contexts to seize evolving growth opportunities.  
                                                     
12 The grouping of countries based on available natural resources and labor are from the World Bank (2014). 
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Resource-rich labor-poor countries, mostly the GCC, expectedly plan long-term, based on many 
documents and still provide quite a lot of details regarding quantitative targets. This might originate 
in the stability of the government, the availability of large funding, the absence of a sense of urge to 
foster structural change in the short-term, a will to tackle the difficulties the country is facing but also 
lesser appetite for transparency. These findings are consistent with Hivdt’s (2012). 
Detailed analyses of planning practices at the country level and over time may help better understand 
the role of the underlying socio-economic context on Arab countries’ planning practices. In particular, 
a careful and detailed mapping of key performance indicators included in planning documents and 
additional information about KPIs that are fully identified or not will inform the main focus of the 
planning process in each country. Patterns in planning practices may then emerge at the regional level.   
Figure 14: Planning under constraints 
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Sources: authors’ calculations, countries classification from the World Bank (2014) 
 
IV. Conclusion and way forward  
This paper investigates the issue of good planning in the Arab region. The need for a developmental 
state, largely involved in the economy, but less as an actor, than as an information providers and a 
facilitator of the transformational process through economic agents’ incentivization. The political 
aspects of displaying information should be acknowledged and information considered as a mean to 
educate Arab people, foster the debate, facilitate the convergence of people claims towards doable 
achievements. In this framework, the interaction of the state with the private sector is crucial to reach 
the envisioned development goals as the private sector is the primary catalyst for economic growth 
and human progress through its investment decisions. However, providing accurate and objective 
information the private sector is not a passive endeavor as the state must actively pursue the 








Based on a brief survey of the changes in development thinking and the role of the state, on one side, 
the experiences and outcomes of Arab countries in the realm of development planning, on the other, 
the paper establishes a basic typology of criteria for good planning. This classification differentiates 
between the internal and external and the operational and strategic criteria. At the very core of good 
planning practices and sound interaction between the state and the civil society, lays the internal and 
operational components of good planning. If these are not met, improving on the other criteria for 
good planning included in the topology will not help improving significantly the effectiveness of 
planning over the long run. The paper thus focuses essentially on the former.  
Good planning starts by developing a broad vision that should be reaffirmed in all planning documents 
to ensure stakeholders can easily and clearly identify their respective contribution. Coordinating and 
harnessing efforts towards the achievement of the stated vision will be facilitated. All documents 
should further set steps, from objectives to programs, actions and goals or KPIs. The KPIs must be fully 
identified that is state what is the situation as of today, where the economy should be, when the 
implementation period starts and ends, what is the magnitude of expected change. The articulation 
between and within planning documents should be rigorous so as to ensure that meeting the KPIS 
implies that all actions have been taken, programs completed and objectives fulfilling, and ceteris 
paribus the vision has been fully implemented. Such a transparent, well-documented and properly 
structured planning approach, if used as a monitoring and evaluation tool, will signal the state’s degree 
of commitment and strengthen its credibility as a policymaker which would reflect positively on 
anchoring people’s expectations. 
Against this background, Arab countries’ planning performances are assessed using a database 
developed by UN-ESCWA. The database contains comparable information about planning documents’ 
content and organization. This paper focuses on the trends in Arab countries planning practices, 
treating the region as a group. Further research can use this rich database to make cross country 
comparisons and country specific case studies. 
The paper establishes first that, the vast majority of planning documents display a broad strategy (95 
per cent) assorted to specific objectives (91 per cent). Second, almost half of the collected planning 
documents lack a multi-sectoral approach. Third, only two out of five have specific and complete KPIs. 
Fourth, KPIs are often not clearly linked to specific objectives (almost 60 per cent of KPIs). Fifth, none 
of the documents meet all identified internal operational criteria for good planning, all of them meet 
at least the first one (specification of a broad strategy) and more than half of them meet the first third 
one listed, which are common-sense. These outcomes provide Arab countries with clear insights about 
the specific areas that need attention as the greatest part of the problem lies in the absence of 
measurable KPIs, insufficient linkage to objectives, and poor affiliation of the plans to global 
frameworks (Annex 3).  
The paper then investigates in greater details Saudi Arabia and Egypt’s planning approaches. Both 
countries have quite sophisticated planning procedures that differ quite a lot. Saudi Arabia’s planning 
approach is more centralized and relies on a relatively large share of not fully identified KPIs than 
Egypt. Its strategy mostly suffers from the absence of reference to the SDGs that could help inform 
the population’s preferred developmental goals. Given the high quality and degree of sophistication 
of planning in the country, this lack of transparency might be a strategy to preserve room for flexibility 
in times of volatile environment and mounting uncertainties. In Egypt, the planning architecture is 
comparatively disorganized. Many KPIs are not fully identified which doesn’t facilitate monitoring and 
evaluation, and doesn’t contribute to solving the problem of planning time inconsistency. Only limited 
credibility gains can be expected from such a planning approach. As a result, the capacity of the state 
to pilot the economy by incentivizing the private sector and the civil society is deficient although they 
are explicitly mentioned as key stakeholders to the planning process and crucial contributors to the 
achievement of stated goals.  
28 
Further research should start by carrying detail analysis for each Arab country along the line of what 
has been done for Egypt and Saudi Arabia. This would help identifying patterns and specificities in 
development approaches that may be used to understand differences in development achievements. 
Arab states are interventionists but a move, away from a state-led development, and towards a 
developmental approach where the private sector is central to the process seems to be in favor in the 
region (Hvidt, 2012). The ways sectoral considerations have been introduced in the plans seems to be 
borrowing from different approaches. Detailed information about the specification of short-term 
phases and a full mapping of the SDGs are all interesting avenues for further research.  
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Annex 2: Hierarchy of planning documents 
Cases where no hierarchy among documents - countries with standalone documents only 
 
Cases where some hierarchy can be found, but no concrete plan about how to achieve the vision 






Cases of good planning that includes both long-term and medium-term documents and link them 
in a clear hierarchy 
 
Cases where some hierarchy can be found, but lack of a vision – countries with NDP as their 





Annex 3: Summary of stylized facts 
 























KPIs, their linkage, and global frameworks 
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